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| Stefano Demichelis and Amrita Dhillon |
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| ''Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout
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| ( 2010, Vol. 12 No.5 ) |
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| Voter turnout in game theoretic models of voting has typically
been difficult to predict because of the problem of multiple
Nash equilibria. Many of these
equilibria require an extreme precision of beliefs among voters that
is unlikely to be reached in real elections. At the same time, mechanisms like
pre-election polls exist to shape the beliefs of voters about expected
turnout. We combine these two features in a model of voter learning
in elections and derive the asymptotically stable equilibria of
both complete and incomplete information games in a simple symmetric setting
with two candidates. We also show how the model can be used to
qualitatively explain several phenomena observed in
reality: increases in costs of voting affect
turnout adversely but there may be persistence of turnout levels
between elections even though costs and other parameters
change. Increase in uncertainty increases turnout while increases in
the size of the electorate decrease it, in line with intuition. |
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| Keywords: Voter Participation, Voter Learning,
Asymptotically Stable Equilibrium, Markov chain, long run equilibria
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JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Oct 07 2008 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 07 2012 |
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